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ABSTRACT 
 
Human rights treaty bodies have been frequently criticized as useless and the regime’s self-
reporting procedure widely viewed as a whitewash. Yet very little research explores what, if any, 
influence this periodic review process has on governments’ implementation of and compliance 
with treaty obligations. We argue oversight committees may play an important role in improving 
rights on the ground by providing information for international and primarily domestic audiences. 
This paper examines the cumulative effects on women’s rights of self-reporting and oversight 
review, using original data on the history of state reporting to and review by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CmEDAW). Using a dynamic approach to study 
the effects of the periodic review process, we find that self-reporting has a significant positive 
effect on women’s rights. We explore three clusters of evidence for the domestic mobilization 
mechanism: information provision through domestic civil society organizations; publicity and 
critique through the domestic media; and parliamentary attention, debate, and implementation of 
recommendations. This is the first study to present positive evidence on the effects of self-reporting 
on rights and to describe the mechanisms that link Geneva bodies with local politics. Our findings 
challenge the received wisdom that the process of reporting to these treaty bodies is basically 
useless. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
A large scholarly literature seeks to explain why states voluntarily commit themselves to legal 
regimes designed to monitor implementation of international human rights standards.1 Dozens of 
human rights treaties have been promulgated over the past six decades and some have gained near-
universal adherence. Yet the consequences of these international commitments for human rights 
practices are hotly contested.  Some argue that international law has contributed very little to 
improving rights.2 Others claim that international human rights law has failed to help the people 
who need it the most.3  Many allege that United Nations (UN) enforcement has been an utter 
failure, and that UN treaty bodies constitute a bloated yet toothless bureaucracy that is unable to 
contribute much to rights protections.  
 
It is time to bring evidence to bear on this debate about the value of UN oversight of international 
human rights law. Studies on the effects of treaty ratification are now plentiful. But none of these 
examine systematically one of the main consequences of human rights treaty ratification: the 
obligatory self-reporting process.4 All major UN human rights treaties have established bodies of 
experts to oversee treaty implementation. States parties are obligated to self-report to these bodies 
of putative experts. Critics uniformly point out that these bodies cannot enforce their 
recommendations. This is true. However, we contend that it does not follow that they are useless 
or without effect. 
 
Why might we expect self-reporting to influence rights outcomes? We posit at least three possible 
channels of influence that do not involve traditional notions of external enforcement.5 Critically, 
reporting to treaty monitoring bodies initiates a dialogue with international experts that can have 
important consequences. This dialogue can contribute to socialization of domestic elites and 
bureaucrats responsible for human rights practices. It may also set in motion domestic bureaucratic 
routines to gather, authenticate, and analyze information that might not have occurred in the 
absence of the obligation to report. It is even possible that reporting helps to develop an 
autonomous capacity to self-monitor and self-enforce.6 
 
                                                     
1 Oona A Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STANFORD LAW REVIEW (2003);BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS : INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS   (Cambridge University Press. 2009). 
2 ERIC A POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW   (Oxford University Press. 2014). 
3  Emilie Hafner-Burton, Making human rights a reality  (Princeton University Press  2013). 
4  There are a small number of case study reports on the influence of reporting to various treaty bodies, but to date 
they have been few in number, limited in geographic scope, and generally inconclusive about the connection 
between reporting and rights outcomes Ronagh McQuigg, How Effective is the United Nations Committee Against 
Torture?, 22 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011);The first CEDAW impact study. (2000). 
5 As many have noted, enforcement mechanisms in the human rights context are likely be indirect, and work through 
non-governmental actors, transnational organizations, information mechanisms, and domestic institutions Geoff 
Dancy & Kathryn   Sikkink, Ratification and Human Rights Prosecutions: Toward a Transnational Theory of 
Treaty Compliance, 44 NYU JOURNAL OF INTERNATINAL LAW AND POLITICS 751(2011-2012);Xinyuan Dai, The 
Conditional Effects of International Human Rights Institutions, 36 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 569(2014);Susanne 
Zwingel, How Do Norms Travel? Theorizing International Women’s Rights in Transnational Perspective1, 56 
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY (2012). 
6 Specialized agencies and INGOs often assist governments who may need technical or data help in reporting to the 
CEDAW, contributing to improved capacity to collect and report data. See for example World Health Organization 
WHO, Women's health and human rights: Monitoring the implementation of CEDAW,  (2007). at 4. 
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While we recognize that self-reporting may impact rights outcomes through these two pathways,  
in this article we focus on how self-reporting and external review provides information and a 
process for domestic audiences and an opportunity to mobilize around issues of concern.7 We 
argue it is thus useful to recast self-reporting not simply as a procedural obligation that supports 
traditional external enforcement, but as an opportunity for a variety of domestic audiences to hold 
their governments accountable to their international human rights commitments. 
 
We use the case of women’s rights to assess the value of self-reporting and the discussion it 
stimulates. Each state party is obligated under the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) to turn in periodic reports on the status of their implementation for 
review by the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CmEDAW). Non-
state actors are also active in this process; they turn in “shadow reports” that give additional 
information on implementation issues to the CmEDAW. The Committee responds to the reports it 
receives, and provides guidance and recommendations on next steps. Governments are asked—
indeed encouraged and obligated—to respond to these questions and recommendations. In this 
way treaty ratification initiates an iterative and ongoing “constructive dialogue” between a 
government and the international human rights regime about progress (or lack thereof) on treaty 
implementation.  
 
Plenty of states have ratified CEDAW, but they have quite heterogeneous laws and traditions in 
place,8 making women’s rights a fertile case for the influence of external review. Several studies 
conclude that ratification of CEDAW is, in fact, associated with improved outcomes for a range 
of women’s rights,9 although many are careful to note that positive effects are highly conditional.10 
None of this research examines the effects of self-reporting. Women’s rights organizations clearly 
use the treaty to focus their demands for specific policies11 and to bolster legal cases.12 The 
CEDAW is therefore a case in which the domestic political reverberations of state-to-expert 
dialogue is plausible.  Our goal in this paper is to shed light on whether and how the legal obligation 
to self-report influences human rights outcomes for women on the ground.  
 
Part II summarizes the treaty-based periodic review process and the claims made about this 
system’s (un)importance. Drawing from original dataset, this article then describes patterns in the 
frequency and quality of states’ reporting under CEDAW, and presents evidence that poor 
                                                     
7 Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (2005).. 
8  Judith Resnik, Comparative (in)equalities: CEDAW, the jurisdiction of gender, and the heterogeneity of 
transnational law production, 10 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2012). 
9  Daniel W. Jr. Hill, Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior, 72 THE JOURNAL OF 
POLITICS (2010);Yonatan Lupu, The informative power of treaty commitment: using the spatial model to address 
selection effects, 57 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (2013);Mark M.  Gray, et al., Women and 
Globalization: A Study of 180 Countries, 1975–2000, 60 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (2006). 
10 Seo-Young Cho, International Women's Convention, Democracy, and Gender Equality, 95 SOCIAL SCIENCE 
QUARTERLY (2014);Wade M. Cole, Human Rights as Myth and Ceremony? Reevaluating the Effectiveness of 
Human Rights Treaties, 1981–2007, 117 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY (2012);SIMMONS. 2009. Kevin Cope 
& Cosette D. Creamer, “Disaggregating the Human Rights Treaty Regime,” 56 VIRGINAL JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 459 (2017). 
11 S. Laurel Weldon & Mala Htun, Feminist mobilisation and progressive policy change: why governments take 
action to combat violence against women, 21 GENDER & DEVELOPMENT (2013). 
12  Recognizing Right, Promoting Progress: The Global Impact of the Convention of [sic] the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women. (2010). 
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reporting is more consistent with lack of state capacity than with a disregard for women’s rights. 
Part III theorizes one primary channel through which we suggest reporting influences women’s 
rights practices: via domestic political awareness and mobilization. Part IV presents systematic 
evidence on the likely effect of reporting and engagement with the CmEDAW on women’s rights, 
while Part V presents evidence supporting a domestic mobilization mechanism in Latin America. 
We show that the causal consequences of self-reporting are reflected in three specific behavioral 
outcomes: the mobilization of domestic women’s organizations that participate in the reporting 
process; coverage of the CmEDAW reporting process in the local media; and evidence of 
legislative action connected with the self-reporting and review process. In short, evidence of civil 
society mobilization, media information and legislative attention plausibly link the reporting 
process with better outcomes for women’s rights on average. Part VI concludes. We emphasize 
that the history of interaction—multiple presentations, Committee responses and evaluation, 
follow up discussions—contribute to measurable if modest improvements in women’s rights. 
These results are the first to show systematically that self-reporting likely has positive 
consequences. The results suggest that the international community should not think of self-
reporting as a hard enforcement mechanism, but rather as an opportunity for domestic stakeholders 
to mold their own futures in the shadow of international law.  
 
 
II. State Reporting on Women’s Rights 
 
Historical context 
 
Public international law has long been recognized as a highly decentralized system that treads a 
delicate line between voluntary participation and enforceable obligations. The more stringent the 
demands made on states, it has long been feared, the less willing they will be to obligate themselves 
to a legal agreement. While self-reporting requirements have been fairly common in a range of 
modern treaties, they only developed gradually in the realm of international human rights law. 
Early efforts to encourage reporting on the implementation of international human rights norms 
were largely reflected in hortatory resolutions “requesting” information, emanating from the 
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations. As 
early as 1947, the General Assembly recommended that the Secretary-General request member 
states to report annually to ECOSOC, who would in turn report to the General Assembly on steps 
taken to give effect to “recommendations made by the General Assembly on matters falling within 
the Council’s competence.”13 This resolution was intended to include the principles contained in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which had no explicit provisions for 
implementation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, few states responded to such a general exhortation. 
ECOSOC thus postponed systematic review and instead perused the few reports it received on an 
ad hoc basis. Five years later, the submission of official state reports remained a rarity, and so the 
Council decided to discontinue the system of self-reporting entirely.14 
                                                     
13 UNGA Resolution 119 (11) “Implementation of recommendations on economic and social matters.” Available at 
file:///C:/Users/BethSimmons/Dropbox/State%20Reporting%20Data/Self-
reporting%20documents/UNGA%20Res%20119%20(1947).html.  
14 Early efforts to set up a self-reporting system are discussed in John Humphrey, Report of the Rapporteur of the 
International Committee on Human Rights, in REPORT OF THE FIFTY-THIRD CONFERENCE [OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW ASSOCIATION] HELD AT BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, AUGUST 1968 (1969). At 439.  
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The first resolution calling for systematic state self-reporting on human rights was passed by the 
ECOSOC in 1956.15 This resolution requested UN members to transmit reports to the Secretary 
General every three years, describing ways in which they were implementing principles of the 
UDHR. John Humphrey, then serving as Rapporteur of the International Committee on Human 
Rights, would later report that 41 states responded as requested in the first round of reporting, and 
67 responded in the second round (1957-1959).  But Cold War rhetoric and a “perfunctory” review 
by the Human Rights Commission rendered the exercise ineffective.16 Self-reporting received a 
boost six years later, when non-governmental organizations with consultative status in the 
ECOSOC were invited to submit their views and observations to the Council. As the ECOSOC 
resolution put it, “to meet the objectives set by the Commission…and to promote respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, a greater number of reports are required 
and more information should be given therein concerning the problems or difficulties which have 
been or may be encountered;…”17 The system of “shadow reporting” by civil society organizations 
was thereby created. 
 
The problem remained state and institutional cooperation. In 1965, ECOSOC invited states to 
participate in a three-year cycle of reporting on specific rights areas, including civil and political 
rights, economic and social rights, and freedom of information.18 This process routed state reports 
through the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, 
which generally failed to read them – an outcome John Humphrey referred to as “a political victory 
won by governments who do not favour the international enforcement of human rights.”19 And 
yet, rights advocates knew they were not in a position to do much more than request state 
information. Despite his frustrations, Humphreys concluded that “Of the various techniques, 
reporting is the one with which the international community has had the most and probably the 
most successful experience…. In a situation where, as today, governments seem to be unwilling 
to vest international supervisory bodies with adequate powers to deal with complaints, reporting 
may indeed, even for these rights, be the most practical means of implementation.”20  
 
Self-reporting as part of a consent-based treaty obligation was another possible route to enhance 
implementation. This approach would build on an explicit legal commitment, and engage expert 
implementation committees rather than the politicized and government-composed bodies of the 
United Nations.  However, the early treaties that dealt with women’s rights had practically no 
implementation provisions. The Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952),21 the 
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1957),22 and the Convention on Consent to 
                                                     
15 ECOSOC Res. 624B (XXII) August 1, 1956. Available at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/766/28/IMG/NR076628.pdf?OpenElement (p. 12).  
16  Humphrey. 1969. 
17 ECOSOC Res. 888B (XXXIV), July 24, 1962. Available at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/759/95/IMG/NR075995.pdf?OpenElement (p. 21).  
18 ECOSOC Res. 1074C (XXXIX) July 28, 1965. Available at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/760/97/IMG/NR076097.pdf?OpenElement (pp. 24-25).  
19 Humphrey. 1969. 
20 Id. at.: 438-39. 
21 Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952) [cite] 
22 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1957) [cite] 
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Marriage (1962)23 all contain interstate dispute settlement through the International Court of 
Justice—provisions that have proved practically irrelevant when it comes to women’s rights—but 
no reporting requirements.24 In the fashion of the day, ECOSOC and the UNGA passed resolutions 
“requesting” and “recommending” states parties to report on implementation,25 and in 1963 
extended this request to all UN members.26 The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights27 as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights28 were 
path-breaking in incorporating this requirement into the treaty text. But until the CEDAW, no 
treaty on women’s rights or issues contained an obligation for parties to self-report.29 
 
Why were women’s rights treaties behind the reporting requirement curve? For several reasons 
that have been the subject of much feminist analysis,30 women’s rights had for many years not 
been seen as central to the main body of human rights, broadly understood. The CEDAW was a 
turning point in this regard. Two important moments in history supported global attention to 
women’s rights. First and most importantly, the women’s movement was at its height between 
1965 and 1985, which gave impetus to the elaboration of women’s rights in international law.31 
Secondly, détente was starting to overtake the Cold War freeze on the negotiation of new human 
rights treaties, and a reasonable degree of agreement existed between East and West on women’s 
rights.32 In early 1967, the United Nation’s Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) began 
drafting a non-binding Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(DEDAW), which was adopted by the General Assembly in November of that year.33 The 
                                                     
23 Convention on Consent to Marriage (1962) [cite] 
24  States parties are required under the Convention of the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the 
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1950 – not quite a human rights treaty, but considered at the time to deal 
with “women’s issues”) to communicate to the Secretary General of the UN the passage of laws relevant to the 
treaty (Article 21).  
25 Resolution 504 E (XVI) of 1953;  
26 Resolution 961 B (XXXVI) of 1963; UNGA res 2018 (XX) “The Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, 
Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriages (1965) 
27 [ICCPR official cite] 
28 [ICESCR official cite] 
29 Note however that several ILO labor conventions aim to protect female workers from discrimination and do have 
a reporting requirement. The conventions include the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 
1958 (No.111), Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No.100), Workers with Family Responsibilities 
Convention, 1981 (No. 156) and the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183). The ILO constitution 
(Article 22) does mandate annual reports, to be examined by both a committee of experts and the International Labor 
Conference itself. 
30 See for example Hilary Charlesworth, et al., Feminist Approaches to International-Law, 85 AMERICAN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991).. 
31 Jane Jenson, Representation of Difference: The Varieties of French Feminism, in MAPPING THE WOMEN'S 
MOVEMENT : FEMINIST POLITICS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE NORTH (Mónica Threlfall ed. 1996);LEILA J. 
RUPP, WORLDS OF WOMEN : THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S MOVEMENT   (Princeton University Press. 
1997);VALENTINE M. MOGHADAM, GLOBALIZING WOMEN : TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST NETWORKS   (Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 2005).. Women’s groups such as the Women’s International Democratic Federation urged 
ECOSOC that “Adoption of the single convention would place the States under the obligation to review existing 
legislation regarding women and indicate the shortcomings that exist in national legislation relative to the equality of 
women with men. It would thus enable the broad mobilization of public opinion around these problems.” ECOSOC, 
“Statement submitted by the Women’s International Democratic Federation, a non-governmental organization in 
consultative status with the economic and Social Council.” E/CN.6/NGO/254. January 11, 1974. 
32 LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE 
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN   (Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1993). 
33 Proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 2263(XXII) of 7 November 1967. 
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ECOSOC and CSW worked on strategies for implementing the declaration over the next several 
years.  In the hortatory tradition described above, one tactic was to ask states to submit reports on 
their implementation efforts voluntarily, but this request elicited very little cooperation.34 By the 
mid-1970s the CSW was working on a draft of a comprehensive and legally binding instrument, 
and by 1976 began to garner the comments of governments and specialized agencies. The 
International Year of the Woman in was declared for 1975, and opened the Decade of the Woman 
from 1976 to 1985, which helped to focus global attention on women’s issues. The CEDAW was 
thus the culmination of a series of multilateral negotiations on women’s issues after World War II. 
 
Self-reporting requirements were very much a part of the discussions of the Working Group that 
drafted the CEDAW. An early Soviet draft did not contain a reporting requirement, directing only 
that the ECOSOC consider periodically whether the convention was being implemented.35 Early 
discussions revealed a willingness to include a reporting requirement, with most states considering 
the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD),36 the International Labor 
Organization (ILO),37 or the ICCPR reporting requirements to be appropriate models.38 The 
Netherlands called for civil society participation in the reporting process “granting these 
organizations the function of correspondent. As correspondents they might play a role in 
channelling [sic] wishes and complaints towards an international forum,” such as the CSW.39  
Canada suggested all reporting go through the CSW, in order to avoid “conflict in implementation 
procedures” across treaties.40 Several countries anticipated the modern critique of reporting 
overlap, and called for simplifications.41 Women’s groups were strongly behind reporting; in fact 
the draft article on state reporting was the only provision mentioned explicitly in a crucial 1976 
statement by a broad coalition of women’s NGOs sent to the Working Group.42  In the end, Egypt, 
Nigeria and Zaire’s proposal to use language almost identical to that contained in the CERD was 
accepted.43 A series of working groups finalized the agreement throughout 1979, and the CEDAW, 
                                                     
34 REHOF,  7. 1993. 
35 ECOSOC, Working Group on a New Instrument or Instruments of International law to Eliminate Discrimination 
against Women, Working paper submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, E/CN.6/AC.1/L.2. January 7, 
1974. Draft Article 22: “Every four years following this Convention's entry into force, the Economic and Social 
Council or the United Rations shall consider the question of the status of the implementation of the Convention in 
order to satisfy itself that the purpose stated in the preamble and articles of the Convention are being carried out.” 
36 [CERD official cite]; Article 9.  
37 [ILO example] 
38 Finland called for a reporting system resembling that of the ILO. ECOSOC, Commission on the Status of Women, 
25th session, “International Instruments and National Standards Relating to the Status of Women: Consideration of 
proposals Concerning a new Instrument of Instruments of International Law to Eliminate Discrimination Against 
Women.” E/CN.6/573, November 6, 1973. At Para 103. Sweden endorsed the model contained in the CERD (Ibid., 
p. 107), as did the CSW. ECOSOC, Commission on the Status of Women, 24th session, “International Instruments 
and National Standards Relating to the Status of Women: study of Provisions in existing conventions that relate to 
the status of women.” E/CN.6/552; January 21, 1972. At para. 236. The Philippines advocating using existing 
machinery, such as the Human Rights Committee, so as to not duplicate reporting requirements. E/CN.6/573, 
November 6, 1973 (para. 106). 
39 E/CN.6/573, November 6, 1973 (para. 105). 
40 E/CN.6/573, November 6, 1973 (para. 104). 
41 E/CN.6/573, November 6, 1973 (Austria, para 108; Brazil, para. 109; Canada para 110). 
42 E/CN.6/NGO/259. August 26, 1976, para. 4. 
43 ECOSOC, Working Group on a New Instrument or Instruments of International law to Eliminate Discrimination 
against Women, “Nigeria and Zaire: Draft proposals concerning the measures of implementation of the draft 
convention.” E/CN.6/AC.1/L.5 January 9, 1974.  With the slight exception of explicitly not requiring the submission 
of information that had been provided to other specialized agencies of the UN. Article 2.1(a and b). 
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with Article 18 describing the obligation to report on implementation, opened for signature the 
next year. 
 
Self-Reporting and the CEDAW 
 
As this history suggests, the major international human rights treaties were meant to improve rights 
through enhanced accountability. CEDAW was the first women’s rights instrument to make self-
reporting obligatory for states parties. By virtue of ratifying CEDAW, states must submit reports 
every four years on the legislative, judicial, administrative, or other measures adopted to give effect 
to their women’s rights obligations.44 Similar to self-reporting under the Covenants and the CERD, 
these reports are submitted to an oversight committee—the CmEDAW—comprised of 
independent experts nominated and elected by states parties. CmEDAW then considers these 
reports in the presence of government representatives, acknowledges progress made, and identifies 
areas for improvement. Finally, oversight committees issue a set of “concluding observations” 
containing non-binding recommendations for legislative reforms and other efforts a government 
should undertake to address shortcomings.45 This entire process is known as “periodic review,” 
with all state reports, reports received from other intergovernmental and civil society 
organizations, and CmEDAW recommendations made public. 
 
In contrast to early resolutions exhorting states to voluntarily report to ECOSOC or the UNGA, 
periodic review was intended to encourage treaty implementation and compliance, with the “main 
responsibility for the international monitoring of national implementation…entrusted to the UN 
human rights treaty bodies.”46 Moreover, since reporting is a mandatory obligation, Kälin refers 
to the report and review process as “the key mechanism established at the universal level to monitor 
the implementation of treaty obligations by contracting states.”47 In the case of CEDAW, 
implementation oversight was initially weaker than that of other major human rights treaties. For 
example, the CmEDAW did not move to Geneva and receive the administrative support of the 
office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, like the other human rights treaty bodies, 
until 2008. Several analysts have concluded that initially at least, CEDAW’s system of 
implementation oversight was probably weaker than that of the two core Covenants.48 
 
The system of self-reporting as a whole continues to be criticized as inadequate, ineffective and 
even “in crisis.”49 Some observers point to the professional inadequacies of the “expert” 
committees.50  Others note that states—even resource rich, democratic ones—ignore what they are 
                                                     
44 Part V, Article 18; CEDAW. 
45 Michael O'Flaherty, The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 6 HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, 36 (2006). 
46 Helen Keller & Geir Ulfstein, UN human rights treaty bodies : law and legitimacy 2 (Cambridge University Press  
2012). 
47 Walter Kälin, Examination of state reports, in UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES : LAW AND LEGITIMACY 16, 
(Helen Keller & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2012). 
48 Neil A Englehart & Melissa K Miller, The CEDAW effect: International law's impact on women's rights, 13 
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2014). at 24.  Susanne Zwingel, From intergovernmental negotiations to 
(sub)national change, 7 INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST JOURNAL OF POLITICS (2005). at 405. 
49 PHILIP ALSTON & JAMES CRAWFORD, THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING   (Cambridge 
University Press. 2000);ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM : UNIVERSALITY AT THE 
CROSSROADS   (Kluwer Law International. 2001). 
50 Hafner-Burton,  102. 2013. 
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told to do by the experts.51 Moreover, there is a growing sense among critics that the system as a 
whole is breaking under its own unwieldy weight.52 As the number of treaties have grown, so too 
have the treaty bodies to which states are expected to report. One result may be reporting fatigue.53 
Late and non-reporting is not uncommon, although CEDAW holds a slightly better record than a 
number of other treaty regimes, which is surprising in light of the weaker initial administrative 
support for the CmEDAW. 
 
Of the 188 states parties to the CEDAW in 2016, only five countries had still not submitted their 
initial report.54 Between 1982 (when the first report was due) and 2016, the average length of delay 
in reports submission was 3.7 years.55  The Committee recently has begun to encourage submission 
of long overdue reports by reviewing implementation progress even in the absence of a state report. 
For instance, although Dominica never submitted its initial report due in 1982, the Committee 
issued concluding observations in 2009 based on an in-person dialogue with Dominican 
government representatives.56 In this way, states are encouraged to participate in a dialogue with 
the CmEDAW, even if they sometimes fail to report. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the record of state reporting to the CmEDAW since the treaty entered into 
force. Between 1982—when the Committee received its first reports—and 2014, governments 
have submitted a total of 621 implementation reports, with absolute report submission increasing 
steadily over the years in tandem with growing treaty membership. Of these, 229 reports were 
considered consolidated or "combined reports" due to delayed submission; in such cases, one 
report ‘counts’ for two (up to four) reports due. Many states have submitted six to eight reports.  
However, many states seem unable to meet their obligation to go beyond an initial or second report.  
 
Ultimately, we want to understand the consequences of state reporting, but first it is critical to 
understand why states report—or fail to—in the first place. All states are obligated to send the 
Committee a report within a year of ratification; each is then required to follow up with a report 
every four years,57 but as we can see, many states are not meeting their reporting obligations. We 
thus begin by simply asking: what factors increase the probability a state will turn in a report to 
the CmEDAW in any given year?   
 
 
                                                     
51  McQuigg, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,  (2011). 
52 POSNER. 2014;Hafner-Burton,  99. 2013. 
53 Françoise J Hampson, An Overview of the Reform of the UN Human Rights Machinery, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
REVIEW (2007);Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling, Treaty Body Reform: the Case of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women, see id. at. 
54 Dominica, Kiribati, Micronesia, San Marino, and Sao Tome and Principe. 
55 The length of time reports are overdue includes those instances where the Committee has indicated in its 
concluding observations on the prior report that a revised date of submission (usually in the near future) is permitted. 
In addition to extending due dates and consolidating reports, the Committee often reviews within one session two 
separate reports submitted by a government. These represent methods through which the Committee has attempted 
to address both systematic late reporting and its own increased workload, deviating from the periodicity mandated in 
the Convention. 
56 The Committee first notifies the states party that in the absence of a report, it will proceed with a consideration of 
the implementation of the Convention on a set date. 
57 CEDAW, Part V, Art. 18.  Text at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#article18. 
(Accessed 15 February 2015).  
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Figure 1: Report Submission by Year, disaggregated by Report Number (whether the report was the first submitted 
by a state party, the second, etc.). 
 
 
Figure 2 presents the expected probability of reporting as each explanatory variable changes, based 
on a pooled logistic odds regression. The figure shows how (holding other traits constant) different 
state characteristics are associated with a higher probability that a state reports in a given year, and 
that states report to the CmEDAW if they have the capacity as well as the political will to do so. 
The evidence for the importance of capacity is strong. The richer and larger a polity, the more 
likely it is to report in a given year. GDP per capita and total population (both logged) are strongly 
and positively correlated with reporting. Small, resource strapped states likely lack the capacity to 
meet their periodic treaty obligations to report.58  
 
There is also some evidence that reporting is, at least initially, correlated with strong buy-in to the 
human rights treaty system in general.  The higher percentage of major human rights treaties a 
state has ratified, the more likely it is to turn in its CEDAW reports, though this relationship is 
substantively not large. As Figure 2 demonstrates, doubling the percentage of human rights treaties 
ratified by a government (from 26 to 52%) only increases its probability of report submission by 
2.5%. That being said, ratification of the CEDAW Optional Protocol (OP), which establishes the 
individual communication’s procedure for the treaty, is not strongly correlated with a higher 
likelihood of reporting, although the OP did not enter into force until 2000. 
 
                                                     
58 We note the similarity between this and a finding in the literature that smaller firms are most likely non-compliers 
with self-reporting to regulatory agencies.  See for example Brehm and Hamilton Noncompliance in environmental 
reporting: are violators ignorant, or evasive, of the law?, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (1996). 
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Figure 2: Likelihood of Reporting to CmEDAW. Simulated estimates of probability of report submission. Circles 
represent the expected effect on the probability of report submission in a given year as GDP per capita, Total 
Population, Polity IV Scores (level of democracy), Women’s Political Empowerment Index (V-Dem), and Human 
Rights Treaties Ratified (percentage of all major human rights treaties) in the previous year changes from its 25th to 
75th quartile, and all other variables are held constant at their means. For Muslim Law, Catholic, Ratification of the 
Optional Protocol, and National Human Rights Institution (NHRI), the circle represents the expected probability of 
reporting as these variables change from 0 to 1, and all other variables are held constant at their means. The lines are 
95% confidence intervals. When the circles and lines are solid, there is at least a 95% confidence of a positive or 
negative effect on the probability of reporting. Otherwise, circles and lines are dotted. See Appendix Table A1 for 
traditional results of the pooled logistic odds regression. 
 
 
In contrast to the Convention against Torture (CAT), under which the existence of a National 
Human Rights Institution (NHRI) strongly correlates with greater likelihood of reporting,59 
countries with an NHRI are neither more nor less likely to report to CmEDAW. Perhaps this type 
of human and institutional resource is not as central to the women’s rights context; what matters 
instead may be the existence of a National Mechanism on Gender Equality (NMGE).60 
Interestingly, democracies or countries that provide greater rights protections are not any more or 
                                                     
59 Cosette Creamer & Beth A Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights: Quality of Participation in the 
Convention Against Torture, 37 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY (2015). 
60 NMGEs include those bodies and institutions within different branches of the State (legislative, executive and 
judicial branches) as well as independent, accountability and advisory bodies that, together, are recognized as 
‘national mechanisms for gender equality’ by all stakeholders. This could be in the form of a Ministry on Women or 
Gender Equality, a gender equality ombudsperson, a parliamentary committee, an inter-ministerial body, or multi-
stakeholder advisory body. See UN Women, Directory of National Mechanisms for Gender Equality, February 
2015. 
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less likely to report to CmEDAW. We were also surprised to find that states with legal systems 
entailing some elements of Islamic law are generally as—if not more—likely than other states to 
report.61  
 
Critics of the periodic review process are right about a number of its limitations. States often 
neglect to turn in their reports on time, if at all. Moreover, many reports celebrate the positive steps 
taken to improve women’s rights and fail to mention any shortcomings. However, many do 
explicitly recognize shortcomings in a country’s implementation of and compliance with treaty 
obligations, particularly when such shortcomings can be attributed to lack of resources.  
 
To evaluate report quality and responsiveness under CEDAW, we read all 621 reports submitted 
to the CmEDAW from 1982-2014 and coded each along four dimensions: three related to report 
quality (implementation, compliance, and data), and one concerning responsiveness. A report’s 
“quality score” (an index of the three quality measures) is based on the states party’s willingness 
to recognize shortcomings in implementation or compliance, and to provide gender-disaggregated 
data. A report’s “responsiveness score” is based on how well the report engages with the 
Committee’s previous concluding observations.62  
 
To be sure, a report’s quality or responsiveness score does not measure the accuracy of the 
information provided, but rather the extent to which it explicitly recognizes and is responsive to 
shortcomings in implementation of and compliance with the treaty’s terms. A higher quality score 
represents more self-critical reports that admit to weaknesses in implementation and compliance. 
Examining report quality permits evaluation of the quality of states’ engagement with the periodic 
review process, not just as a procedural obligation, but as an opportunity for government officials 
and their constituents to learn about and become socialized into the women’s rights regime. 
 
Figure 3 displays the average quality and responsiveness scores of reports submitted, by year. 
While the quality of reports submitted to CmEDAW has improved over the years,63 there has not 
been that much improvement since the mid- to late-1990s. What has improved dramatically, 
however, is responsiveness to CmEDAW’s concluding observations (for second or later reports), 
suggesting increased engagement with the periodic review process and Committee 
recommendations. The CmEDAW has increasingly provided more detailed and concrete 
recommendations, which appears to have facilitated this greater responsiveness. 
 
 
 
                                                     
61 Perhaps understandably, more Catholic societies are less likely—though not significantly—to report. Yet a bit 
surprisingly, neither the proportion of women in parliament nor the proportion of states reporting in the region 
(regional reporting density) increases a state’s reporting likelihood (results not reported). 
62 See Appendix B for the coding scheme and description of the coding process. 
63 This observation is at least partially consistent with Kathryn Sikkink’s KATHRYN SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: 
MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE 21ST CENTURY   (Princeton University Press. 2017). observation on the 
availability of information about HR violations increasing over time. 
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Figure 3: Average CEDAW Report Quality and Responsiveness by Year. See Appendix B for coding guidelines. 
 
 
 
III. Theory: Self-Reporting and Review in Domestic Politics 
 
While valuable, understanding why states report and that these reports display fairly high quality 
and responsiveness provides no indication of whether the reporting regime fulfills its stated 
purpose: to facilitate improved women’s rights practices and increased treaty compliance. Hafner-
Burton represents the informal consensus among commentators when she writes that “the reports 
often don’t seem to lead to results that matter.”64 Even members of the CmEDAW have 
surprisingly little to tell us about the impact of the Committee on actual state practices.65 
 
Our central question is thus whether reporting matters to treaty implementation and respect for 
women’s rights. We theorize that it does, primarily because of the dynamics underlying the 
reporting process itself.  Many theories of compliance with international law rely implicitly on the 
availability of information about government activities and legal obligations, particularly to 
domestic publics. For example, it is possible that knowledge that one’s government is publicly 
committed to comply with a human rights treaty raises domestic groups’ expectations that they 
can demand compliance with such treaties . Xinyuan Dai  argues that information produced by 
international bodies informs domestic audiences about the activities of their governments and 
whether a government has complied with its international legal obligations. This information 
allows domestic constituencies to apply electoral pressure on their government in order to hold 
them accountable. 
 
                                                     
64  Hafner-Burton,  100. 2013. 
65   H.B. SCHÖPP-SCHILLING & C. FLINTERMAN, THE CIRCLE OF EMPOWERMENT: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE UN 
COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN   (Feminist Press at the City University of 
New York. 2007). 
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We argue that the very event of reporting serves to stimulate attention, discussion, and perhaps 
even participation in the process of report drafting. By mobilizing and empowering groups within 
and outside of government, reporting can have a catalytic effect in promoting internal policy 
reform. The Committee’s concluding recommendations provide domestic constituencies with 
information needed to apply electoral and other forms of political pressure to encourage 
substantive compliance. Such information facilitates evaluation of a state’s treaty compliance, 
which helps domestic audiences to focus pressure on the government to perform better.66  Even 
when states are less than forthright, their reports provide a focal point for non-state actors to assess 
and criticize the information provided. As Jacqui True has written of the international reporting 
process, “[O]rganizing of women’s groups for the purpose of international reporting and global 
conferencing has consequently, often unintentionally, increased the effectiveness of women’s 
lobbying of local and national governments.”67  Examples abound, from Southeast Asia68 to 
India69 to Nigeria.70 A formal report submission presents opposition parties or NGOs and other 
rights constituencies with a convenient and visible occasion for mobilization. Indeed, political 
activism may contribute to the quality of governmental reporting over time by helping to expose 
its shortcomings. If so, then even incomplete or inadequately analyzed official information is much 
better than none at all.  
 
If the reporting cycle (by which we mean the process over time of both submitting reports and 
receiving CmEDAW feedback and recommendations) can mobilize demands for better rights 
practices, we would expect to observe a positive relationship between a state’s participation in this 
process and improvements in its women’s rights practices. We do not expect this effect to be 
homogeneous across all states, but we do expect to see such a relationship if we have appropriately 
weighted for the effects of regime type on outcomes. Part IV evaluates this expectation. 
 
Second, we would expect to see some evidence consistent with the mobilization argument, 
especially under conditions for which the theory is clearest: a region of the world that has 
                                                     
66 A growing number of experimental studies provide micro-level data to supplement the largely observational 
literature connecting international obligations with enhanced compliance expectations.  Adam Chilton (2014) finds 
some evidence that attitudes in the general population shift against domestic solitary confinement practices when 
informed that they may violate international legal obligations. Attitudes about the appropriateness of torture 
specifically have been shown to be influenced by international legal obligations, particularly when it is believed that 
third parties may enforce obligations Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes Toward 
Torture: An Experimental Study, 67 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (2013).. These observations—that international 
legal obligations raise expectations of compliance; that reporting provides new information about the progress of 
compliance; and that authoritative third parties enhance these effects—all suggest that self-reporting to treaty bodies 
may be important for mobilizing publics and improving human rights practices on the ground. 
67 Jacqui True, Mainstreaming Gender in Global Public Policy, 5 INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 
377 (2003). 
68 For example, in Cambodia, NGO-CEDAW’s role is to monitor and promote the implementation of CEDAW and 
to engage in advocacy following the publication of each NGO Shadow Report.  See http://ngocedaw.org/?page_id=7 
(Accessed 16 February 2015).  For an assessment of the capacity-building effects of CEDAW reporting on NGO 
capacity in Southeast Asia see http://cedawsouthasia.org/2959/sri-lanka-to-be-reviewed-by-human-rights-
committee-in-october.  
69 See for example the virtual call for shadow reports at http://cedawsouthasia.org/2959/sri-lanka-to-be-reviewed-by-
human-rights-committee-in-october.  
70 See for example International Federation for Human Rights, The Nigeria NGO coalition shadow report to the 
CEDAW committee, 31 July 2008, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/48a0007a2.html [accessed 16 
February 2015] 
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experienced democratic transitions during which governments must engage in balancing the 
tradeoff between expectations and information consequences involved in the reporting decision. 
Part V follows up with evidence on the mechanism of mobilization in Latin America—a region 
that fulfills these conditions—in the form of civil society shadow reporting, media reporting, and 
domestic legislative activity. 
 
IV. Evidence: Reporting, Review, and Women’s Rights 
 
This section examines how the process of periodic review and the history of a government’s 
engagement with the CEDAW regime impact subsequent rights practices. Because the act of treaty 
ratification itself generates the expectation of report submission, we focus only on states parties to 
the CEDAW. For this analysis, we collected panel data on CEDAW report submission and 
Committee review for 184 states parties between 1982 and 2014. By the beginning of 2014, only 
seven of these states parties had not completed even one reporting-and-review cycle, 101 had 
completed between two and four cycles, and forty-six had completed five or more cycles. 
 
Even though we found no evidence of a correlation between women’s rights guarantees and the 
likelihood of reporting,71 Figure 4 plots trends in average Women’s Political Empowerment scores 
by reporting record.72 These trends demonstrate that countries with greater initial levels of 
women’s empowerment have gone through more periodic review cycles since CEDAW entered 
into force. That being said, countries that engage relatively regularly in periodic review 
(specifically more than two report-and-review cycles) have experienced greater improvements 
over time in women's empowerment than those who have never submitted a report (or did so only 
once). 
                                                     
71 We found no significant correlation between the probability of report submission and a country’s Women’s 
Political Empowerment score (V-Dem), Women’s Economic Rights score (CIRI) or Women’s Political Rights score 
(CIRI. See Figure 2 and Appendix Table A1. 
72 See Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, 
Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly 
McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Laura Saxer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, and 
Jeffrey Staton. 2017. “V-Dem Codebook v7.1 “Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. See Appendix Figure A1 
for similar trend figures using CIRI Women’s Political and Economic Rights. 
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Figure 4: Trends in Women’s Political Empowerment (V-Dem) by Reporting Group. Figure plots the average 
Women’s Political Empowerment score for (1) countries that had ratified CEDAW but not submitted any reports or 
had submitted only one report by 2014; (2) countries that had submitted 2-4 reports by 2014; (3) countries that had 
submitted 5+ reports by 2014. The index ranges from 0 to 1 and incorporates equally-weighted dimensions of 
fundamental civil liberties, women’s open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, 
and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions. 
. 
 
Self-reporting and periodic review is an ongoing and iterative process with potentially cumulative 
effects. It was never intended or designed to affect rights practices through a single report 
submission. Modeling the effects of a single-shot report is thus not the best approach to analyzing 
the dynamic nature of periodic review to the CmEDAW, since both the act of reporting and the 
evolving nature of the review process represent treatment variables of interest. Estimating the 
cumulative influence of the reporting and review process as a whole requires a different approach 
from conventional regression estimators for single-shot effects. To attempt to adjust for the 
dynamic nature of periodic review, we fit a Marginal Structural Model (MSM).73 
 
This approach entails two steps. First, we estimate a model for treatment—here, CmEDAW 
review—in each time period, conditional on time-varying confounders and past reporting 
history.74 Then, we fit a regression model for the outcome, given treatment and treatment history, 
by weighting each observation with the inverse of its treatment probabilities calculated in the first 
                                                     
73 This approach was developed by Robins et al (2000) and recently introduced to political science by Blackwell 
(2013). These models are estimated using an Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW) estimator, which 
permits adjustment for intermediate confounders while avoiding bias from conditioning on a post-treatment variable. 
74 Because the decision to engage in the report-and-review process is binary, we estimate the probability of 
undergoing review with a logit model and the parameter vector for the model with a pooled logistic regression, with 
country-year as the unit of analysis. This permits us first to estimate the probability, in each period, that the unit 
received the treatment history that it did. 
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step.75 The parameters of this weighted regression model bring us closer than ordinary regression 
to causal analysis, assuming we have not omitted important causal variables, though it does not 
completely overcome issues that arise due to selection into the self-reporting process based on 
unobservable factors. Given the paucity of viable solutions to that problem, however, we view this 
approach as a substantial improvement over traditional methods. 
 
The weighting models estimating the probability of treatment (CmEDAW review at time (t) 
include all potential confounders: covariates expected to influence both the decision to undergo 
periodic review and women’s rights practices. As discussed within Part II, capacity (measured 
with logged GDP per capita and population, as collected by the World Bank) and engagement 
with the international human rights regime (proxied by the percentage of major human rights 
treaties ratified) strongly predict report submission. These variables likely affect women’s rights 
outcomes as well, so we include them and a number of additional time-varying covariates in the 
weighting model: the degree of women’s political empowerment in each country (as measured by 
V-Dem); a country’s level of democracy (as measured by its Polity IV score); the existence of an 
NHRI; and ratification of CEDAW’s Optional Protocol. 
 
We also include two non-time-varying covariates in the model. Governments with elements of 
Islamic law within their legal systems are slightly more likely to submit their CEDAW reports, but 
present special challenges for CEDAW adherence.76 Similarly, we include a non-time-varying 
indicator for whether Catholicism is the dominant religion within a country. Predominantly 
Catholic countries are slightly less likely to submit their reports, and the strong role of the Catholic 
religion within society may make governments more reticent in fully implementing CEDAW 
guarantees, particularly in the realm of reproductive and family rights.77 We thus include it as a 
potential baseline confounder. 
 
In addition to these confounders, we include within the weighting models a set of treatment history 
variables; in this case a state’s history of CmEDAW periodic review. This permits us to estimate 
the average treatment effect of both the single-shot treatment of undergoing review and the history 
of a country’s engagement with the review process on a government’s women’s rights practices. 
These treatment history variables include: the total number of in-person CmEDAW reviews 
undertaken by a country by time t; whether the country had undergone review in the previous year; 
and the number of years since the last review.78 All weighting models include year fixed effects.79 
 
In a second step, we fit an inverse-probability weighted MSM to estimate the effects of CmEDAW 
review (the treatment) and the review process (treatment history variables) on women’s human 
                                                     
75 Robins et al (2000) show that this weighting scheme adjusts for confounding by observed and time-varying 
confounders. Intuitively, weighting creates a hypothetical ‘super-population’ where the link between treatment and 
observable confounders is broken. 
76  Anita M. Weiss, Interpreting Islam and Women's Rights: Implementing CEDAW in Pakistan, 18 INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIOLOGY (2003). 
77  (Simmons 2009: 221, 245-253). 
78 Following Blackwell (2013) and Cole and Hernan (2008), we conduct a preliminary model check based on the 
final distributions of the stabilized weights for each year. The stabilized weights’ means at each point in time are all 
close to one, with their upper bounds relatively low, indicating we have estimated a set of fairly well-behaved 
weights. See Appendix Figure A2. 
79 See Appendix Table A2 for weighting model estimates. 
 18 
rights practices at year t+2. Because we have few priors about precisely when we should expect 
the review process to affect women’s rights practices on the ground, we estimate its relationship 
with a government’s rights record two years following review, as significant reforms of deficient 
legislation and practices often cannot occur instantaneously. Indeed, one of the primary 
conclusions of case studies on the effectiveness of the CmEDAW is that implementing Committee 
recommendations often takes several years.80 
 
There are potentially dozens of ways to measure women’s rights.  One possibility would have been 
to test indicators that relate to specific articles of the CEDAW, such as a measure of women’s or 
girls’ education, health, or employment outcomes.81As a first cut, we have instead elected to test 
broad measures of women’s political empowerment and fundamental civil rights (as developed by 
the Varieties of Democracy project), largely because the periodic review dialogues are broad-
ranging and cover issues that differ by country and even by report.82 We estimate an ordered probit 
model that includes the inverse-probability of treatment weights for Women’s Political 
Empowerment (V-Dem). All models include a linear time trend. Confidence intervals were 
obtained using a cluster bootstrap procedure for the entire two-stage weighting and MSM fitting 
procedure, clustering on country.83  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Estimated CmEDAW review treatment and treatment history effects. Circles represent 
estimated effect of undergoing a single review (compared to not undergoing review) at time t and 
undergoing one additional review at time t, on Women’s Political Empowerment score at t+2. Lines denote 
95% cluster-bootstrapped confidence intervals (20,000 iterations, clustering on country). See Appendix 
Tables A3 and A4 for outcome model coefficients and respective bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
                                                     
80 The Impact of the CEDAW Convention: Paths to Equality. (2012). 
81 SIMMONS. 2009. 
82 For a discussion of V-Dem and its Women’s Political Empowerment Index, see Kevin L Cope, et al., Exploring 
Disagreement in Indicators of State Repression (January 1, 2018, 2018). Aksel Sundström, et al., Women’s Political 
Empowerment: A New Global Index, 1900–2012, 94 WORLD DEVELOPMENT (2017). As a check, we also run 
analyses using CIRI Women’s Economic and Political Rights measures. CIRI Women’s Economic Rights data 
include a series of sub-indicators relating to such matters as an equal right to paid work (without a husband’s 
permission) and working conditions, non-discrimination with respect to pay and promotions, etc.  Political Rights 
include the right to vote, run for and hold public office, join political organizations, and petition government 
officials. See Appendix Figures A4, A5, A6, A7 and Tables A5 and A6. 
83 We ran the bootstrap for 20,000 iterations and took the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the bootstrapped 
distribution for the MSM parameter estimates. 
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Figure 5 plots the estimated instantaneous and history effects of the review process along with 
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. We find that the single, instantaneous effect of review at 
time t on women’s political empowerment at time t+2 is statistically indistinguishable from 0. 
That is, there are essentially no effects on women’s political empowerment attributable to turning 
in one report. However, as Figure 5 demonstrates, increasing the number of times a country 
previously engaged in CmEDAW review significantly increases the degree of Women’s Political 
Empowerment observed. We estimate that a country that receives one additional review 
throughout its history will, on average, have a women's political empowerment score that is 
approximately 0.05 higher—a small but statistically significant effect. 
 
How sensitive are these results to unobserved confounders? Figure 6 presents results for a 
sensitivity analysis procedure as described in Blackwell (2013).84 We assume unobserved 
confounding where countries that receive review and countries that do not receive review differ in 
their underlying potential Women's Political Empowerment score by α. This parameter denotes 
the amount of the difference in women's political empowerment scores between treated (additional 
review) and untreated (no additional review) countries that can be explained by some unaccounted-
for factor. The procedure varies α across a range of values and re-estimates the treatment history 
effect after adjusting for the assumed amount of unobserved confounding. α = 0 denotes the 
original effect estimate. Positive values of α denote situations where treated countries have better 
women’s political empowerment scores than control, while negative values of α assume treated 
countries have worse women’s rights records. 
 
The analysis demonstrates that for the estimated effect of review to no longer be significant at 
conventional levels (p < 0.05), countries undergoing an additional review would have to have 
systematically higher women's political empowerment scores than countries that do not. Until α = 
0.06, a bit more than the treatment effect size, the estimated positive effect of reporting history 
remains statistically significant at p < 0.05. In other words, even if—due to unaccounted-for 
factors—countries undergoing an additional review had systematically better women's political 
empowerment records by an amount slightly more than the effect size, we could still conclude 
with moderate confidence that review history has a positive effect on women's political 
empowerment scores. 
 
                                                     
84 Matthew Blackwell, A framework for dynamic causal inference in political science, 57 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
POLITICAL SCIENCE (2013). 
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Figure 6. Sensitivity analysis for review history effect. Dotted and dashed lines denote 90% and 95% cluster-
bootstrapped confidence intervals respectively (20,000 iterations, clustering on country). 
 
 
To summarize, governments that engage in more dialogue with the CmEDAW are more likely 
cumulatively to provide greater women’s fundamental rights. The very fact of participating in the 
review process may provide an opening for constructive engagement with the treaty monitoring 
body that promises small and incremental improvements in women’s political empowerment over 
time. This opening seems to have important consequences, even if the quality of initial reporting 
is not especially high. These findings support the conclusion that it is the constructive dialogue 
with the CmEDAW as an ongoing process—one made possible by iterative report submission and 
conversation—that holds the potential to improve rights practices on the ground. In this respect, 
periodic review under CEDAW has continuous, albeit small, positive effects on women’s rights 
guarantees from the cumulative exercise of reporting, to review, to the next report’s preparation. 
 
 
V. Evidence of the Mechanisms: Women’s Rights in Latin America 
 
What mechanisms lead to the positive effects associated with reporting found in the previous 
section? We hypothesize that the review process mobilizes domestic demands for closer scrutiny 
of and improvement to laws and practices surrounding women’s rights. If reporting in Geneva 
matters to implementation, we should see some evidence of that at the domestic level. Specifically, 
we look for: mobilization of domestic civil society around reporting in the form of shadow reports; 
discussion of the reporting process in local media; and evidence that legislators begin to take note 
and consider how to improve treaty implementation through legislation. If in fact the reporting 
process stimulates domestic policy change from the bottom up, we would expect to observe these 
three key activities: political mobilization, public discourse, and legislative attention. 
 
 21 
For several reasons, we focus in this section on Latin America.85 First, Latin American countries 
vary considerably in how regularly and promptly they engage in periodic review. Second, this is a 
region in which the strong influence of the Catholic Church within many countries makes women’s 
rights socially and politically salient. Combined with its history of relatively democratic 
institutions, active civil society, and meaningful press freedom, Latin America is a plausible 
candidate to investigate the potential for the periodic review process to acquire some level of 
publicity and to focus public and political attention on women’s rights practices. 
 
Mobilization: Civil Society Shadow Reporting 
 
CEDAW ratification has had an influence on domestic politics by stimulating formation of 
women’s organizations, at least in some cases. In fact, memberships in women’s organizations 
increase post-ratification.86 This is because CEDAW helps to legitimize specific rights demands: 
those guaranteed by law. In addition, the CEDAW self-reporting procedure creates high-profile 
assessment opportunities. We argue that women’s organizations—both local and transnational—
take advantage of the reporting process to make these rights demands and hold their governments 
accountable for treaty implementation.87 
 
When governments turn in their self-rendered reports, women’s groups regularly spring into action 
to correct, supplement, and criticize the official account of implementation progress. Indeed, the 
Committee has increasingly urged governments to consult with women’s civil society 
organizations (CSOs) when preparing their reports. The “shadow reports” of these CSOs constitute 
evidence that women’s groups have an active existence, are aware of CEDAW treaty obligations, 
and are motivated to monitor the implementation process. As such, they are a critical part of the 
conversation that links Geneva with domestic politics in states parties; they act as conduits for 
information flowing in both directions.  
 
Figure 9 displays the average number of shadow reports per state report received by the CmEDAW 
between 2007 and 2014,88 broken down by report type. While there is noticeable variance across 
years, there is an unmistakable upward trend in shadow reporting since about 2010. But do these 
reports reflect domestic mobilization around the reporting process, or rather international groups 
reporting from afar? To find out, we coded whether each CSO submitting alternative information 
                                                     
85 We have reasons to believe that the domestic mechanisms discussed here have their counterparts in Advanced 
democracies (see for example, FRAUKE LISA SEIDENSTICKER, EXAMINATION OF STATE REPORTING BY HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATY BODIES: AN EXAMPLE OF FOLLOW-UP AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL BY NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS   
(DEU. 2005). available at: https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/32911/ssoar-2005-seidensticker-
Examination_of_state_reporting_by.pdf?sequence=1) and elsewhere in the world. 
86 Even when controlling for country and year fixed effects, a time trend, and a lagged dependent variable, there is 
significant evidence that membership in women’s international non-governmental organizations grew in the first and 
second year after CEDAW ratification. Simmons at pp. 210-211. 
87 Here we focus on non-governmental organization (NGO) shadow reporting as an example of mobilization of 
women’s groups, but it is important to recognize that international NGOs as well as Intergovernmental 
Organizations, such as the World Health Organization and the International Labor Organization, regularly take this 
opportunity to engage states on implementation steps. Our point is not that domestic actors are the only ones to 
mobilize around reporting, but that the reporting regime in fact penetrates domestic politics where implementations 
policies ultimately take place. 
88 The OHCHR has yet to make available online shadow reports received before 2007. These data are tentatively 
reliable, in as much as they represent what is available on the OHCHR site.  
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could be considered a domestic CSO, an international CSO,89 or in fact was a National Human 
Rights Institution (NHRI). For the 182 state reports submitted between 2007 and 2014, CSOs 
provided the Committee with a total of 1,026 shadow reports, about a third of which (332) came 
from what can be considered a domestic CSO; NHRIs provided an alternative shadow report for 
only 22 of these 182 state reports. Moreover, domestic groups contributed the most to the growth 
in reporting, especially since 2010. Interestingly, high-quality and responsive state reports were 
just about as likely to elicit shadow reporting as were low-quality and unresponsive official 
reports.90 
 
 
Figure 9: Average number of Shadow Reports submitted per State Report, 2008-2014. Based on shadow 
reports posted to the UN Treaty Body Database, available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/  (last accessed January 30, 
2018). 
 
A close examination of the shadow reports from Latin American countries indicates that domestic 
civil society actors are willing to point out the shortcomings in the state reports and explain to the 
CmEDAW exactly how the government has fallen short. For Argentina’s 2010 periodic review, 
for example, domestic CSOs contested Argentina’s implementation by revealing the inaction on 
the part of the government to use data to guide public policy on matters of economic and social 
policies pertaining to women’s health and trafficking.91 Many of the shadow reports emphasize 
the lack of effective implementation of laws and policies to improve women’s health and security. 
For example, domestic CSOs exposed the abuses of women in prisons at the hands of male prison 
                                                     
89 By “domestic CSOs” we mean organizations based in-country and which took primary responsibility for 
compiling the report, even if assisted by an international non-governmental organization (INGO). By contrast, 
“international CSOs” are not based in-country and operate on a (near-)global scale. 
90 See Appendix C. 
91 Equipo Latinoamericano de Justicia y Género (ELA), Center on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE); the 
Programa “Género, Sociedad y Universidad”, Secretaría de Extensión de la Universidad Nacional del Litoral 
(“Programa de Género”); Acción por los derechos en el Noroeste (ADN); and the Asociación por los Derechos 
Civiles (ADC), “Shadow Report for the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,” 46th 
Session (July 2010). Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/. 
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staff, an issue scarcely noted in the Argentine state report.92 The CmEDAW itself takes such input 
seriously and often incorporates this information into its recommendations.93 
 
Shadow reports indicate mobilized women’s groups elsewhere in Latin America as well. In 
response to Brazil’s 2012 state report, anti-human trafficking groups exposed the continuing gaps 
in the country’s law to address domestic trafficking and prostitution of women.94 A broad coalition 
of women’s groups in Chile supplied information on the underreporting of violence and crime 
against women, and pointed to the government’s failure to implement laws on the books, from 
criminalizing femicide to advancing anti-trafficking awareness to facilitating access to modern 
forms of contraception and other kinds of women’s reproductive health care.95 Neglect of violence 
against women, femicide, and disappearances of women and girls—in conjunction with the 
inadequate official response—was a central theme of Mexico’s National Citizens' Observatory on 
Feminicide.96 In Uruguay, human rights organizations pressed the government to incorporate the 
CEDAW’s definition of “discrimination against women,” and to create national plans to achieve 
objectives from women’s access to justice to health care.97 Uruguay’s National Human Rights 
Institute sent the Committee a separate shadow report as well.98 During Venezuela’s 7th and 8th 
(combined) reviews in 2014, nine separate shadow reports were received—some from broad 
coalitions — covering topics from LGBTQ rights to equal access to health care for women.99 
 
In sum, shadow reports are authentic and critical domestic efforts to hold governments accountable 
for implementation of their obligations under CEDAW. These reports are the foot print that CSOs 
leave of their concerns about state implementation of women’s rights obligations. Some of these 
reports require considerable research, consultation, and collective action. As such, they represent 
                                                     
92 Joint CSO Submission, “Women’s Human Rights: Argentine State Pending Debts,” Alternative Report from 
CSOs in Connection with the Submission of the Sixth Periodic Report of the States Parties (CEDAW/C/ARG/6) to 
the Committee for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, 46th Period of Sessions (2010). 
Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/.   
93 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Conclusions and recommendations of the 
Committee against Torture: Argentina, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ARG/CO/6 (13 July 2010), para. 28. 
94 Coalition against Trafficking in Women, “Information on Brazil for consideration by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women at its 51st Session” January 25, 2012. Available at: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/.  
95 Articulación Feminista por la Libertad de Decidir, “Chile: Shadow Report to the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women,” 53 Session, October 2012. Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/. 
Many of these issues were echoed in the summary records and the concluding observations. See Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against 
Torture: Chile, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHL/CO/5-6 (2 October 2012), paras 12, 20, 22. 
96 National Citizens' Observatory on Feminicide, “Submission to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women with regard to the consideration of the combined 7th and 8th Periodic Report of 
Mexico.” June 2012. Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/. These concerns are explicitly mentioned in the 
CmEDAW’s concluding observations. See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Mexico, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MEX/CO/7-8 
(17 July 2012), paras 15, 17, 20. 
97  Latin American and the Caribbean Committee for the Defense of Women’s Rights, et al: “Alternative Report for 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,” May 26, 2016. Available at: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/. 
98 “Report by the National Institution of Human Rights of Uruguay” June 10, 2016. Available at: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/.  
99 See shadow reports posted under Venezuela’s 7-8th CmEDAW review on the UN Treaty Body Database, available 
at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/. 
 24 
the mobilization of groups and organizations to press governments for implementation and 
compliance.  
 
Information: Coverage of Periodic Review in Domestic Media 
Does the reporting process reverberate beyond dialogue between organized civil society groups, 
the government, and the treaty body? To be meaningful domestically, there must be some public 
awareness of the existence of review and the issues it entails. To establish whether this in fact 
occurs, we searched the major local press outlets of fifteen Latin American countries for awareness 
and discussion of the reporting-and-review process.100 Each news article was coded for whether it 
mentioned the focal state’s CEDAW obligations, the CmEDAW, and/or the reporting and review 
process specifically.  If the “constructive dialogue” with the Committee is invisible to domestic 
publics, we would expect little to no reference to any of these topics in the local press. But if such 
dialogue matters to domestic audiences, we should see a spike in press references, followed by a 
somewhat higher degree of attention in the news to CEDAW and the CmEDAW during and after 
the review year. 
 
Media evidence collected is generally consistent with the hypothesis that the conversations 
initiated by the periodic review process between Latin American governments and the CmEDAW 
have had important reverberations in the local (national) press, at least in Argentina and Mexico, 
and slightly less so in Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Figure 10 demonstrates strong evidence of 
a spike in attention by the local press in these countries to the review process, particularly during 
the year of in-person review (0).  
 
 
                                                     
100 The countries for which we could find a reliable and searchable media database include: Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. We identified the top three newspapers (by circulation) using www.pressreference.com, 
supplemented with queries to regional and country experts or citizens. It was not possible to search electronically all 
three outlets for every single year since the CmEDAW entered into force, but in each case we searched as many 
years as possible from 1982 to the present. Using three specific combinations of search terms in Spanish and 
Portuguese (“CEDAW”, “convención AND discriminación AND mujer”, and “comité AND discriminación AND 
mujer”) we collected all news articles mentioning the CEDAW, the CmEDAW, and/or the periodic review process. 
We only collected and coded articles published by a newspaper within and about the reporting state. We did not 
collect media stories for states prior to their ratification of CmEDAW, but we did search for them regardless of 
whether or not a state had in fact met its reporting obligation(s). 
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Figure 10: Domestic Media Coverage of CEDAW and CmEDAW review in Latin America. Figure indicates the 
number of domestic newspaper articles that reference the CEDAW, the CmEDAW, or the in-person periodic review 
and/or the concluding observations and recommendations issued by the CmEDAW (Periodic Review). References are 
averaged over the number of CmEDAW reviews (CEDAW reports) undertaken by each country within its searchable 
time period. References are centered around the year of review (0). For Argentina, the searchable period is 1996-2014 
and covered 3 CmEDAW reviews. For Brazil, the searchable period is 2003-2014 and covered 3 CmEDAW reviews. 
For Chile and Mexico, the searchable period is 2005-2014, and covered 2 CmEDAW reviews for each country. For 
Uruguay and Venezuela, the searchable period is 2002-present, and covered 2 CmEDAW reviews for each country. 
 
 
Argentina has been incredibly diligent about submitting its CEDAW reports, with all seven reports 
due submitted within two years of the due date.101 Argentina also has a large private media sector, 
although the relationship between the press and both Kirchner administrations was particularly 
tense. We searched the two most influential national daily newspapers—Clarin and La Nacion—
for references to CEDAW and the periodic review process. La Nacion is considered to have a 
respectably center-right editorial position, and is often viewed as the smart but conservative 
                                                     
101 For efficiency’s sake, the CmEDAW sometimes reviews two state reports in one session; thus Argentina has only 
appeared before the Committee and received recommendations five times (in 1988, 1997, 2002, 2010, and 2016). 
 26 
mainstream paper of Argentina.102 During the searchable period (2005-2014), this paper 
referenced CEDAW a total of twenty-five times, but only two of these articles referenced the 
CmEDAW. Much of this coverage is of the contentious 2007 ratification of CEDAW’s Optional 
Protocol, strongly opposed by the Catholic Church, which viewed the individual communication 
procedure as a step toward the decriminalization of abortion.103 Interestingly and contrary to our 
expectations, none of the La Nacion articles searched discuss the 2010 periodic review process. 
 
In line with our expectations, however, the relatively middle-of-the-road publication Clarin 
referenced CEDAW fifty-six times during the searchable period (1996-2014), fifteen of which 
discuss the periodic review process. Many of these articles cover the shadow reporting conducted 
by domestic civil society organizations,104 but some are critical of the government’s lack of 
implementation  of CEDAW obligations and Committee recommendations.105 For instance, an 
editorial in 1998 considered that four bills before the legislature intended to emphasize the self-
determination of rape victims and to criminalize other types of sexual assaults fell far short of 
CmEDAW’s 1997 recommendations.106 In a society where the political influence of the Catholic 
Church is strong, the vast majority of articles on CEDAW and Committee recommendations 
unsurprisingly discuss those relating to family planning policies and the decriminalization of 
abortion. 
  
Much of the Mexican media coverage is highly critical of the state of women’s rights in Mexico, 
and quite specific about the CmEDAW recommendations to improve.  For example, El Universal 
covered the CmEDAW’s critical questioning of the Mexican representative during the periodic 
review of August 2006.107 Follow-up articles noted CmEDAW (and other) pressures on Mexico 
to address homicides and disappearances of women in Ciudad Juarez.108 Several articles followed 
CmEDAW review of Mexico’s report in 2012, mentioning its specific recommendations to 
implement measures to protect female journalists from violence109 and to diffuse the CEDAW by 
translating it into thirteen indigenous languages.110  
 
Like Argentina, Chile has submitted all of its reports—most of relatively high quality—on or soon 
after the due date.111 Chile’s traditionally active press, closely tied to the country’s competitive 
political parties, has been reasonably attentive to this review process. The country’s most 
influential, center-right publication, El Mercurio (searchable from 2005-2015) has covered 
Committee recommendations in a relatively neutral tone. For instance, a couple of articles provide 
balanced coverage of CmEDAW’s lengthy questioning of the Director of the National Service for 
Women (SERNAM) Laura Alborno in 2006. Alborno is quoted as stating “clearly and 
                                                     
102 See, e.g., Carlos Ares, “El periódico conservador argentino 'La Nación' ha cumplido 115 años,” El País, 6 
January 1985. 
103 La Nacion, “Critican que se apruebe una ley que dara luz verde a todo tipo de abortos,” 16 November 2006. 
104 Clarin, “La situacion de la mujer en la Argentina,” 7 August 2002. 
105 Clarin, “Una pesada deuda con las mujeres,” 28 September 2002. 
106 Clarin, “La mujer de hoy y sus problemas,” 12 March 1998. 
107 El Universal, “Critican al país por la violencia de género,” 18 August 2006.   
108 El Universal, “La ONU critica rezagos en el país para proteger a mujeres,” 07 September 2006. 
109 El Universal “Propondrá PAN evaluación a funcionarios electos,” 26 September 2013. 
110 El Universal “Traducen para indígenas instrumentos para respeto a DH de mujeres,” 20 August 2013. 
111 Thus far, the Chilean government has appeared before the CmEDAW for periodic review four times (1995, 1999, 
2006, 2012), typically led by the Director of the National Service for Women (SERNAM). 
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emphatically that legislating on abortion or decriminalization is not contemplated within the 
government program of President Bachelet.”112 As within a number of other countries in Latin 
America, press coverage tends to focus on the legal status of abortion and a country’s relationship 
with CEDAW. 
  
Coverage of CmEDAW review in Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela is considerably less frequent. 
Publications within these countries, when discussing women’s rights, tend to reference Inter-
American obligations rather than the UN regime. In Uruguay, El Pais (searchable from 2002-
2015)—largely supportive of the right-wing conservative political party—and La Republica 
(searchable from 2003-2015)—a more center-left publication—provided scattered coverage of 
CmEDAW review, largely in relation to other international obligations. In Venezuela, one of 
Caracas’ most influential dailies—El Nacional (searchable from 2002-2015)—only references 
CmEDAW review twice, but provides strong coverage of activities of the National Institute of 
Women (Inamujer) and local NGOs working toward gender equality. 
 
Overall, the press in Latin American countries facilitates robust information and even debate about 
the reporting and review process. This suggests that a causal mechanism linking the reporting 
process to domestic information, awareness, and eventual mobilization varies across countries, but 
overall is highly plausible. 
 
Political Attention: Self-Reporting in Legislative Debates 
A number of CEDAW obligations—from criminalizing gender-based violence to prohibiting 
gender discrimination in public educational systems—depend on implementing legislation. The 
centrality of the legislature to ensuring treaty compliance has been recognized by the Committee 
itself; it has at times called on a government “to encourage its parliament…to take the necessary 
steps with regard to the implementation of […] concluding observations.”113 In this section, we 
look for evidence that parliaments are aware of CEDAW obligations and the CmEDAW itself. Our 
model of the iterative influence of the reporting process suggests that legislators should draw on 
the Committee’s recommendations soon after a country’s review and that these references should 
cumulate over time. We also examine the content of parliamentary debates for evidence that laws 
relating to women’s rights were nudged by the substance of CmDAW’s recommendations or 
concluding observations. We expect the self-reporting process to link to legislative debates over 
gender-focused laws, constituting one pathway through which periodic self-reporting and review 
under CEDAW impacts women’s rights on the ground. We focus on Argentina, Chile, Mexico and 
Uruguay, four major Latin American countries for which a significant legislative history is 
available online. 
 
Argentina  
 
Argentina roughly fits our expectations for a state whose dialogue with the CmEDAW has made 
a mark on legislative activity.  Figure 11 demonstrates that attention to CEDAW in the legislature 
has surged in three distinct swells following review, growing with each round of interaction with 
                                                     
112 El Mercurio, “En Resumen,” 17 August 2006; El Mercurio, “Poli Notas,” 2 December 2006. 
113 See, e.g. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Conclusions and recommendations of 
the Committee against Torture: Argentina, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ARG/CO/6 (13 July 2010), para. 10. 
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the CmEDAW. In two of three reporting years, there are references to the committee and/or its 
recommendations. In 2013, more than a quarter of all legislative sessions included at least one 
reference to CEDAW, and more than ten per cent of all sessions that year contained at least one 
mention of the Committee, its recommendations, or the review process itself.  
  
 
Figure 11. References to the CEDAW regime within Argentina’s legislature (2001-2016). Figure displays the 
percentage of all sessions held by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in a given year in which at least one legislator 
referenced the CEDAW regime, categorized by reference type: the treaty itself (CEDAW); the CmEDAW; or the 
periodic review process/recommendations. Horizontal dashed lines represent years in which Argentina either 
submitted a Report or the CmEDAW issued its concluding observations (Review). 
 
How did CEDAW influence legislation? Following its 2002 CEDAW review and 2004 follow-up, 
the new government undertook a number of legislative reforms to further implement CEDAW 
obligations and to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis on women.114 For example, in 
supporting the creation of a National Program for Sexual Health and Responsible Procreation, 
Senator Gomez de Bertone (PJ) noted that despite the fact that CmEDAW had ‘forgiven’ (se le 
perdonan) Argentina for many implementation deficiencies due to the economic crisis, it had 
strongly recommended the enactment of this bill.115 
                                                     
114 This included ratification of the CEDAW Optional Protocol (March 2007); adoption of a Comprehensive Law on 
the Prevention, Punishment and Elimination of Violence against Women in their Interpersonal Relations (Law 
26,485 (2009)), which covers all forms of gender-based violence, including physical, psychological, sexual, 
economic and patrimonial violence and creates the Observatory on Violence; ratification of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the two Palermo protocols thereto by means of Law 25,632, 
and the adoption in April 2008 of the Law on the Prevention and Punishment of Trafficking in Persons (Law 26,364 
(2008)), which amends the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure and prohibits and punishes all forms 
of trafficking in persons. 
115 República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Perído 120o, 31a Reunión, 16a 
Sesión ordinaria (30 octubre 2002); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Conclusions 
and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Argentina, U.N. Doc. A/57/38(SUPP) (16 August 2002), 
para. 361. 
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We found further evidence that the CmEDAW interactions are at least occasionally on legislators’ 
minds. Legislators within both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies reference CEDAW 
obligations (and the Committee’s General Recommendations) when discussing bills or programs. 
Legislators cited specific CEDAW provisions and CmEDAW General Recommendation 19 when 
discussing modification of the penal code to incorporate violence against women or femicide,116 
the Comprehensive Law on the Prevention, Punishment and Elimination of Violence against 
Women in their Interpersonal Relations (2009) and its further implementation,117 and data 
collection for sexual crimes.118 Frequent references to specific CEDAW provisions and one 
reference to CmEDAW recommendations have also been made in debates over bills addressing 
sexual and reproductive health services,119 which was a specific focus of the Committee’s 
concluding observations.120 
 
 
Chile 
 
Chile has a strong history of attention to the status of women in society, having established as early 
as 1949 a Legal Office for Women, followed by the National Office for Women in 1951.121 The 
government has been a reliable self-reporter that typically engages actively with the CmEDAW. 
Chile also elected its first female President in 2006, Michelle Bachelet of the center-left Socialist 
Party (Partido Socialista de Chile), who achieved gender parity within her first Cabinet. 
 
Chile’s legislature has not been as explicitly tuned to the CmEDAW as has the executive, however. 
A pattern of parliamentary mentions similar to Argentina’s is found in Chile’s legislature, though 
without as obvious a cumulative effect over time. Although mentions of CEDAW in the legislature 
                                                     
116 República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Período 130o, 2a Reunión, 1a 
Sesión ordinaria (14 marzo 2012); República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, 
Período 130o, 16a Reunión, 11a Sesión ordinaria (3 octubre 2012); República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la 
Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Período 134o, 8a Reunión, 2a Sesión ordinaria (8 junio 2016); República Argentina, 
Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Dirección de Taquígrafos, Período 130, 5a Reunión, Sesión ordinaria (18 abril 
2012). 
117 República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Período 133o, 5a Reunión, 4a 
Sesión ordinaria (1 julio 2015). 
118 República Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Dirección de Taquígrafos, Período 131, 8a Reunión, 6a 
Sesión ordinaria (3 julio 2013). 
119 República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Período 131o, 6a Reunión, 2a 
Sesión ordinaria (24 abril 2013); República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, 
Período 131o, 12a Reunión, 6a Sesión ordinaria (3 julio 2013); República Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de la 
Nación, Dirección de Taquígrafos, Período 130, 11a Reunión, 8a Sesión ordinaria (27 junio 2012); 119 República 
Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Dirección de Taquígrafos, Período 131, 6a Reunión, 5a Sesión 
ordinaria (5 junio 2013). 
120 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Summary Record of the 926th meeting, forty-
sixth session: Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/SR.926 (13 July 2010), para. 38. 
121 Chile has long focused on the status of women in society. However, in the 1970s, with the transition to military 
rule, a National Secretariat for Women formed mainly to promote the military regime’s ideology. When Chile 
transitioned to democracy in 1990, cultural debate over women’s issues had effectively been non-existent for 20 
years. Nevertheless, on the heels of democratic transition, advances in the status of women were led by the National 
Office for Women’s Affairs (SERNAM), established in January 1991. SERNAM was a public agency whose 
Director held ministerial rank as a member of the Presidential Cabinet.   
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are not as frequent as is the case in Argentina, legislative attention does appear to increase slightly 
after every review year, with a fairly steady increase in legislative attention since 2011. In 
particular, mentions of review and/or recommendations have recently increased.  
 
 
Figure 12. References to the CEDAW regime within Chile’s legislature (1999-2016). Figure displays the percentage 
of all sessions held by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in a given year in which at least one legislator referenced 
the CEDAW regime, categorized by reference type: the treaty itself (CEDAW); the CmEDAW; or the periodic review 
process/recommendations. Horizontal dashed lines represent years in which Chile either submitted a Report or the 
CmEDAW issued its concluding observations (Review). 
 
CEDAW has been brought into discussions relating to wage equality, the decriminalization of 
abortion, and the minimum age for marriage.122  The persistent wage and employment gap between 
women and men, despite women’s higher education levels, has been an area of concern for the 
Committee since Chile’s transition to democracy.123 In 2008 and again in 2012, Senators drew on 
CmEDAW’s recommendations to support legislation that modified the Labor Code to safeguard 
the right to equality in remuneration.124 The Committee has also consistently urged the Chilean 
legislature to amend laws relating to abortion, to permit pregnancy termination for therapeutic or 
health reasons.125 Controversial debates within the legislature during the 2000s over whether and 
how to decriminalize abortion ultimately led to the adoption of a law in 2017 to do so in instances 
                                                     
122 See Concluding Observations, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/4 (16 August 2006), paras 21-22; Chamber Leg 
355 Session 59; Chamber Leg 362 Session 113 – 13-jan-15. 
123 Concluding Observations, U.N. Doc. A/50/38 (24 January 1995), para. 109; Concluding Observations, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/4 (16 August 2006), paras 11-12; Concluding Observations, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/5-
6 (2 October 2012). paras 32-33. 
124 Senate Leg 356 Session 36 – 15-jul-08. Boletín 4356-13, became a law in 2009. Ley Nº 20.348 (Diario Oficial 
del 19/06/2009); Chamber Leg 364 Session 2 – 16-mar-16. 
125 U.N. Doc. A/54/38/REV. 1(SUPP) (22 January 1999), para. 229; Concluding Observations, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/4 (16 August 2006), paras 19-20; Concluding Observations, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/5-
6 (2 October 2012). Paras 34-5. 
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of rape, danger to the life of the mother, or danger to the life of the fetus.126 The bill for this 
legislation was initially introduced by President Bachelet, and justified with reference to 
CmEDAW’s (and other’s) recommendations.127 She reminded legislators “[o]ur country cannot 
avoid these recommendations by postponing a decision, nor can it continue to ignore the serious 
violation of rights that this situation poses.”128 These recommendations and the need for Chile to 
fulfill its international obligations were relied upon by deputies, particularly from the Socialist 
Party, supporting the proposed bill during its subsequent debate.129 
 
 
Mexico 
 
In Mexico, we see precisely the pattern one might expect if the process of self-reporting and 
Committee review is salient in legislative activity. Mexican legislators have referred to CEDAW 
obligations and Committee recommendations when legislating on women’s rights more frequently 
than others in the region, particularly during the last decade. Yet in the first twenty years after 
ratifying CEDAW, discrimination and violence against women remained a persistent problem in 
Mexico. Following the democratic transition in 2000, the new government instituted constitutional 
reforms that prohibited gender discrimination and established the National Women’s Institute 
(INMUJERES) in 2001. The following year, INMUJERES submitted 30 pieces of legislation on 
questions affecting women, including political participation, sexual harassment, social security, 
job discrimination and violence.130 
 
Despite these efforts, violence against women has remained a serious concern of the CmEDAW 
and featured prominently in their 2002, 2006, and 2012 reviews and concluding observations.131 
These concerns have not gone unnoticed by legislators in Mexico, particularly those from the Party 
of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), the minority Labor and Citizen’s Movement parties at that 
time.132 In 2009, Deputy Humberto Dávila Esquivel (New Alliance Party) proposed a bill to 
                                                     
126 Regula  la  despenalización  de  la  interrupción  voluntaria  del embarazo  en  tres  causales, Ley N° 21.030 
(Diario Oficial del 23/09/2017). 
127 Mensage No 1230-362, Mensage de S.E. La Presidenta de la Republica con el que Inicia un Proyecto de Ley que 
Regula la Despenalización de la Interrupción Voluntaria del embarazo en Tres Causales, 31 January 2015. 
128 Ibid. Chamber Leg 361 Session 22 – 7-may-13 pp. 172-173. See also reference to these recommendations within 
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harmonize the concept of family violence in the Federal Civil Code with CEDAW and the 
provisions of the General Law on Women's Access to a Life Free of Violence. He mentioned the 
CmEDAW’s 2006 recommendations to do just this.133 The bill died almost immediately, however. 
Similarly, when speaking in favor of a call by the Commission for Gender Equality for three 
Mexican state congresses to criminalize the offence of femicide, Senator Angélica de la Peña 
Gómez (PRD) cited CmEDAW’s recommendations regarding this issue.134 More successfully, 
adopted reforms of the 2007 Law of Access of Women to a Life Free From Violence (Ley General 
de Accesso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia),135 proposed and supported by Senators 
Gloria Bautista Cuevas (PRD)136 and María Candelaria Ochoa Ávalos (Citizen’s Movement),137 
relied on CmEDAW’s recommendations for how to strengthen this law. 
 
In addition to concerns about violence against women in Mexico, CmEDAW recommendations 
have been drawn on to support gender-related reforms of labor laws,138 health policies,139 and 
government institutions,140 among other topics. 
 
                                                     
Unidos Mexicanos, Versiones Estenográficas, Legislatura LXII, Año II, (13 febrero 2014); Senado de la República, 
Comisión Permanente del H. Congreso de la Unión, Versiones Estenográficas, Legislatura LXII, Año III, Segundo 
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Figure 13. References to the CEDAW regime within Mexico’s Congress (2000-2016). Figure displays the percentage 
of all sessions held by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in a given year in which at least one legislator referenced 
the CEDAW regime, categorized by reference type: the treaty itself (CEDAW); the CmEDAW; or the periodic review 
process/recommendations. Horizontal dashed lines represent years in which Mexico either submitted a Report or the 
CmEDAW issued its concluding observations (Review). 
 
Uruguay 
 
Uruguay is among the first Latin American countries to enfranchise women (in 1937), ratify 
CEDAW (1981), establish an office to deal with women’s concerns (1991),141 and sign on to 
CEDAW’s Optional Protocol (2001). Despite this strong political commitment to (international) 
women’s rights and in contrast to Mexico, legislative references to CEDAW are sparse and 
recently on the decline.  
 
                                                     
141 The National Institute for Family and Women’s Affairs was replaced in 2002 by the National Women's Institute, 
created under the Ministry of Social Development (Law No. 17.866, Article 6) to act as the governing body for 
gender policies, and is responsible, under Law No. 17,930 of 19 December 2005, for fulfilling the state’s 
international obligations relating to non-discrimination on the basis of gender.  
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Figure 14. References to the CEDAW regime within Uruguay’s legislature (2000-2016). Figure displays the 
percentage of all sessions held by the Senate and House of Representatives in a given year in which at least one 
legislator referenced the CEDAW regime, categorized by reference type: the treaty itself (CEDAW); the CmEDAW; 
or the periodic review process/recommendations. Horizontal dashed lines represent years in which Uruguay either 
submitted a Report or the CmEDAW issued its concluding observations (Review). 
 
Even so, references to the CmEDAW and its recommendations have featured regularly in 
Uruguayan legislative discussions. For example, at least one Senator referenced CmEDAW’s 2002 
recommendations142 when debating a bill defining gender discrimination and promoting equal 
opportunities and rights.143  These same concluding observations also made a number of specific 
recommendations, including repealing a law mitigating rape charges when the person who 
committed the offense married the victim.144 The Committee’s “harsh criticism”145 sparked 
renewed discussion of Penal Code reform and a bill was introduced in the Senate the following 
year.146 During all subsequent discussions of the bill in the Senate147 and the Chamber of 
                                                     
142 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Conclusions and recommendations of the 
Committee against Torture: Uruguay, U.N. Doc. A/57/38(SUPP) (24 January 2002), paras 186-7. 
143 Senate, Leg XLVI (third period) Session 1 – 6-mar-07; the bill became Law No. 18.104 of 6 March 2007. 
144 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Summary Record of the 541st meeting, twenty-
sixth session: Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/SR.541 (24 January 2002), para. 14; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Uruguay, U.N. Doc. A/57/38(SUPP) (24 
January 2002), paras 196-7. During its in-person dialogue with the Committee, the Uruguayan delegate recognized 
that the provision was a “vestige of a former time” and so “no longer used, and therefore no one had taken the 
trouble to have it revoked.” Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Summary Record of 
the 541st meeting, twenty-sixth session: Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the 
Convention, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.541 (24 January 2002), para. 29. 
145 Chamber Leg XLVI (first period) Session 1 -21-dic-05, p. 81. 
146 Senate - Leg XLV (fourth period) Session 2 – 11-mar-03. 
147 Senate - Leg XLVI (first period) Session 37 – 10-aug-05; Leg XLVI (first period) Session 48 – 4-oct-05. 
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Deputies148 elimination of this provision was framed as necessary to respond to the Committee’s 
recommendation. The rape mitigation provision was repealed on December 29, 2005.149  
 
The low rate of political participation by women in Uruguay also caught the attention of the 
CmEDAW. During its 2008 review, one Committee member indicated that it was “lamentable that 
nearly 30 years after Uruguay’s accession to the Convention, so few women were involved in 
politics or occupied decision-making positions.”150 The Uruguay government representative cited 
cultural resistance to quotas,151 but also noted that the Committee’s recommendations “would 
undoubtedly help to raise awareness of Uruguay’s shortcomings in terms of women’s political […] 
participation.”152 Legislators within both the Senate153 and the Chamber of Deputies154 explicitly 
drew on these recommendations when discussing a controversial bill to progressively implement 
gender quotas for government elections, which passed in 2009.155 
 
As a final example, the Committee again criticized Uruguay’s Civil Code and Code on Childhood 
and Adolescence, which set the minimum age for marriage for girls at 12 years, and recommended 
that the legislature raise the age to 18 years.156 Senators referenced these recommendations when 
debating a bill to increase the minimum age of marriage,157 which eventually was raised to 16 
years. This age still fell below CEDAW’s requirement of 18 years, leading the Committee to once 
more criticize Uruguay’s legislative implementation during its 2016 review.158 There is little 
doubt, however, that dialogue with the committee has raised the urgency of the issue in the 
legislature. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
148 Chamber refs: Leg XLV (fifth period) Session 12 – 1-apr-04; Chamber Leg XLVI (first period) Session 1 -21-
dic-05. 
149 Law No. 17.938. 
150 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Summary Record of the 857th meeting 
(Chamber A), forty-second session: Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the 
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against Women, Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Uruguay, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/URY/CO/7 (23 October 2008), para. 30. 
151 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Summary Record of the 857th meeting 
(Chamber A), forty-second session: Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the 
Convention, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.857 (23 October 2008), para. 3. 
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153 Leg XLVI (fourth period) Session 16 – 14-may-08; Leg XLVI (fourth period) Session 57 – 11-nov-08; Leg 
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154 XLVI (fifth period) Session 8 – 24-mar-09 
155 Law No. 18.476 of 3 April 2009, which provides for the equal political participation of women and men in 
elected bodies, although it was applied only once during the 2014 national elections. 
156 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Conclusions and recommendations of the 
Committee against Torture: Uruguay, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/URY/CO/7 (23 October 2008), paras 46-7. 
157 Senate, Leg XLVI (fifth period) Session 22 – 14-jul-09; Leg XLVII (fourth period) Session 8 – 2-apr-13. 
158 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Conclusions and recommendations of the 
Committee against Torture: Uruguay, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/URY/CO/8-9 (14 July 2016), paras 45-6. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
Criticisms of the reporting and review process of the various human rights treaty bodies are far 
more common than rigorous assessments of their actual consequences.  While we do not dispute 
there are weaknesses in the reporting system, the evidence presented here is a striking contrast to 
the literature and folk wisdom on state interactions with expert human rights treaty bodies.  We 
have found evidence to suggest that self-reporting and dialogue between state representatives and 
international experts indeed generates new ideas, advice, and domestic pressure for change in 
practice.  The periodic review process may well have been important to making improvements in 
law and in practice to guarantee full political and economic rights for women in many societies 
(indeed, on average, as our quantitative analysis suggests). As anyone would expect, the effect on 
improved women’s rights guarantees is not massive, but it is all the more believable for its modest 
size.   
 
We also found that continued interactions are important to such improvements; modeling one-shot 
effects proved useless.  The number and the density of reports and reviews are crucial to the process 
of rights improvements. This is certainly far more realistic a finding than to expect last year’s 
report drafting or conversation with the experts to yield one-shot improvements in women’s 
political and economic rights in the following year or so. Reporting and review histories has had 
a causal influence on the probability of improved women’s rights, in law and in practice. This 
suggests that in the context of CEDAW, the effects of the periodic review process are ongoing, 
albeit incremental, from internal report preparation to external dialogue to domestic engagement 
to the next internal report preparation. 
 
One of the most important accomplishments of this article is its demonstration of a plausible 
mechanism: domestic mobilization. We theorized and demonstrated three mutually reinforcing 
pathways through which the self-reporting process encourages domestic actors to demand and 
implement change. Domestic shadow reports are on the rise and indicate local CSOs are following 
the process closely and provide information that supplements and sometimes contradicts 
government reports. Media reports about the CEDAW spike during the reporting and review 
process, signifying the penetration of information about the Geneva process to local stakeholders. 
And finally, we were able to document legislative attention to the review process and even to trace 
the impact of specific CmEDAW recommendations in the lawmaking process. Taken together, the 
evidence points to the catalytic role of self-reporting and review in putting important women’s 
rights issues on national agendas, thereby creating an occasion for their national discussion. 
 
We are not claiming of course that by examining the self-reporting regime we have exhausted the 
channels through which CEDAW may influence women’s rights. CEDAW may be consequential 
for its influence on a number of channels, from influencing donor’s development assistance 
policies159 to clarifying violations through the optimal individual complaint process.160 We also 
acknowledge that states have quite heterogeneous experiences in their interactions with the 
                                                     
159 Liam Swiss, The adoption of women and gender as development assistance priorities: An event history analysis 
of world polity effects, 27 INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGY (2012). 
160 Kwong-Leung Tang, The leadership role of international law in enforcing women's rights: The Optional 
Protocol to the Women's Convention, 8 GENDER & DEVELOPMENT (2000). 
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CmEDAW,161 and that no amount of dialogue can nor should create homogeneous outcomes. The 
quality of interactions as well as the legal, cultural, and political context can be expected to produce 
quite different results across states. 
 
And yet the evidence supporting the contribution of constructive dialogue to rights improvements 
is reasonably strong.  One reason for this finding is that the review process sparks shadow reporting 
and gains a domestic audience through the national media.  Far from finding that no one pays 
attention to this process outside the halls of Geneva, it turns out that in Latin America at least the 
review process literally piques the media’s, and potentially the public’s, interest.  The national 
media in Latin America, for example, is replete with discussions and debates about what 
governments are telling the experts, how shadow reports shape the conversations, what CmEDAW 
has asked, and how governments have responded.  There is plenty of official excuse-making going 
on, but a surprising amount of criticism as well. Legislators take up these themes in official 
sessions. These patterns are consistent with a theory that treaties matter because discussing human 
rights engage interested domestic publics, who are in a better position, armed with legal rights and 
better information, to hold their governments accountable. 
 
Our research suggests that it might be useful to move away from trying to force the treaty body 
reporting-and-review process onto the spectrum of weak to strong enforcement measures162 and 
instead to think of the whole process as more of a dialogue, or as Zwingel puts it, “a constant 
process of negotiating and renegotiating norms.”163 Indeed, such a reporting regime may in fact 
be quite a cost-effective way to improve law compliance.164 At least our evidence suggests it is 
making a noticeable contribution at the margins in the realm of women’s rights. Moreover, the 
strength of such a reporting-and-review process may not be tied to a specific treaty. We leave for 
further research whether our findings also hold in other international settings that involve similar 
review report-and-review processes, such as Universal Periodic Review before the UN Human 
Rights Council.  
 
We hasten to add that the reporting regime is not a comprehensive solution to the world’s worst 
human rights abuses. Even though CEDAW ratification is now nearly universal, it has proved 
impossible to coerce a meaningful conversation out of unwilling states. Constructive dialogue only 
has effects when it actually takes place. That said, the results of this research suggest that the 
reporting and review system should be supported rather than disparaged. We agree with the critics 
who point out the problems of stretched resources and redundant processes. But a look at the 
evidence suggests that self-reporting and receiving recommendations has an important causal role 
to play in starting conversations that reverberate domestically and open up possibilities for change.   
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